Control methods are applied worldwide to reduce predation on livestock by European red foxes (Vulpes vulpes). Lethal methods can inflict suffering; however, moral debate about their use is lacking. Non-lethal methods can also inflict suffering and can unintentionally lead to death, and yet both the welfare consequences and ethical perspectives regarding their use are rarely discussed. The aim of this study was to investigate the animal welfare consequences, the level of humaneness, the ethical considerations and the moral implications of the global use of fox control methods according to Tom Regan’s animal rights view and Peter Singer’s utilitarian view. According to Regan, foxes ought not to be controlled by either lethal or potentially harmful non-lethal methods because this violates the right of foxes not to be harmed or killed. According to Singer, if an action maximises happiness or the satisfaction of preferences over unhappiness or suffering, then the action is justified. Therefore, if and only if the use of fox control methods can prevent suffering and death in livestock in a manner that outweighs comparable suffering and death in foxes is one morally obligated to use them. It is clear that lethal fox control methods and some non-lethal methods are inhumane.

This article provides an empirically based, interdisciplinary approach to the following two questions: Do animals possess behavioral and cognitive characteristics such as culture, language, and a theory of mind? And if so, what are the implications, when long-standing criteria used to justify differences in moral consideration between humans and animals are no longer considered indisputable? One basic implication is that the psychological needs of captive animals should be adequately catered for. However, for species such as great apes and dolphins with whom we share major characteristics of personhood, welfare considerations alone may not suffice, and consideration of basic rights may be morally warranted—as for humans. Although characteristics supporting the status of personhood are present to differing degrees among the diverse array of animal species, this is a barrier to moral consideration only if anthropocentric, exclusive, and monolithic viewpoints about the necessary prerequisites for personhood are applied. We examine the flaws inherent within such positions and argue for inalienable species-appropriate rights.